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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2105 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
TRAVON DAWKINS,  
 
                                    Appellant. 
_______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 09-cr-00163) 
District Judge:  Honorable Alan N. Bloch 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 10, 2011 
_______________ 
 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed March 22, 2011) 
 _______________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge 
Appellant Travon Dawkins (“Dawkins”) appeals his judgment and sentence, 
entered on April 15, 2010.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.   
  2 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we need not repeat the facts or 
procedural history of this case, which the District Court has previously set forth.  (App. 
Vol. I 1-15.)  Dawkins argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress evidence found during a Terry
1
 search because the stop of the vehicle and the 
resultant seizure were not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion.  Dawkins 
contends that the resultant frisk and search of his person, the evidence seized (crack 
cocaine and marijuana), and his answers to questions are all “tainted by the illegality of 
the initial stop under the „fruit of the poisonous tree‟ doctrine and the evidence must be 
suppressed.”  (Appellant‟s Br. at 6).   
In its detailed Order, the District Court thoroughly explained its reasons for 
denying the motion to suppress.  (See App. Vol. I 6-14.)  First, the Court held that the 
initial vehicle stop on February 23, 2006 was permissible because it was necessary to 
allow the officers to execute an arrest warrant on the passenger, Billy Love Dawkins 
(“B.L.”).  Therefore, the officers were justified in stopping Dawkins‟s vehicle.  Second, 
there was reasonable suspicion to frisk Dawkins.  An investigatory stop is permissible 
under the Fourth Amendment if it is lawful.  The officer must have a reasonable suspicion 
that the person apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal offense.  In order 
to engage in a frisk after an investigatory stop, the officer must reasonably suspect that 
the person stopped is armed and dangerous.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.  The officers met the 
                                                 
1
 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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first condition by lawfully stopping the vehicle, armed with the knowledge of the 
outstanding arrest warrant for B.L., and detaining Dawkins pending B.L.‟s arrest.  
Moreover, the fact that Dawkins appeared to be attempting to flee gave the officers 
reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous.  The District Court found that the 
officers had a reasonable suspicion that Dawkins was armed and dangerous, particularly 
because he was in the company of a well known drug trafficker, who was known to carry 
weapons and to associate with individuals who carry weapons.  In addition, B.L. had 
made threats against the police; specifically, against one of the arresting officers, Officer 
Sealock. 
 The District Court‟s Order succinctly and accurately analyzed the relevant law and 
applied it to the facts here.  We find that the District Court properly denied the motion to 
suppress.  Further, the scope of the frisk was permissible and the drugs lawfully seized 
because the frisking officer concluded that the bulges in Dawkins‟s pants were 
contraband before he eliminated the possibility that they were weapons.  See United 
States v. Yamba, 506 F.3d 251, 259 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‟s Order. 
